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 1.  Introduction 
A substantial literature in political economy has examined how partisan governments can 
influence the fiscal choices of their successors by issuing government debt.  Persson and 
Svennson (1989) show that a “stubborn conservative” policy maker might run deficits to 
reduce the ability of a future “liberal” government to spend.
1   In a model with two 
categories of government spending, Alesina and Tabellini (1990) show that polarization also 
produces a bias towards government debt, as each government tries to reduce the resources 
available to future governments that may have different spending priorities. 
This paper considers government commitments to ongoing spending programs that require 
future outlays.  Such commitments are pervasive in practice.  A current example is the debate 
about health insurance in the United States, which is centrally about setting up an 
administrative structure that will influence future spending.  Both the proponents and the 
opposition agree that such a program will be difficult to downsize or abolish once it is 
established.  
We contend that spending constraints are important for understanding partisan politics 
because they may provide a counter-weight to the stubborn conservative’s ability to constrain 
spending through debt.  In a model similar to Persson and Svennson (1989), we show that a 
“stubborn liberal” policy maker can use precommitted spending to prevent a later 
conservative government from imposing decisive spending cuts.  Such commitments may 
help explain why a welfare state is difficult to scale down.  In a model where parties differ 
about spending priorities (similar to Alesina and Tabellini, 1990), we show that re-election 
  1uncertainty may create a permanent bias towards higher government spending and higher 
taxes. 
Because some level of forward commitment can be rationalized by efficiency arguments, the 
challenge here is to show that partisan politics will under some conditions lead to excessive 
commitments.  That is, once the institution of forward commitment has been established, it is 
prone to be used in ways that may actually reduce the cost-effectiveness of the production of 
public goods and services. 
Our primary model is an endowment economy with a private good and a publicly provided 
good.  There are two types of governments with different preferences over the two goods, as 
in Persson and Svensson (1989).  We will use the label public good for the publicly provided 
good, even though it may not be a public good in the strict public finance sense.  The public 
good is produced with private sector inputs that are contracted to be employed 
contemporaneously or one period ahead.  Production costs are minimized if both types of 
contracts are used.  We show that there is a basic tension between cost-minimization and 
partisan politics.  On one hand, efficiency considerations provide incentives toward 
moderation, to ensure that a future government of the other type does not use a grossly 
inefficient mix of inputs.
2  On the other hand, higher or lower levels of inputs can be used to 
nudge the next government toward providing more or less of the public good, because 
                                                                                                                                                       
1 We follow the US usage of the label “liberal” to refer to governments with a preference for high public 
spending. 
2 When reelection is uncertain, a government that, say, puts a high value on public goods has an incentive to 
order fewer precommitted inputs than when reelection is certain, because the inputs would be inefficiently used 
in the event a low-spending government comes to power.  A low-spending government has a corresponding 
incentive to undertake a higher level of forward spending than under certain reelection, because a future high-
spending government would otherwise buy too much on the spot market.  An intermediate level of forward 
commitment is most efficient. 
  2precommitted purchases change the marginal productivity of the contemporaneously 
purchased input.  Outcomes then depend on the strength of preferences and the degree of 
substitutability between the inputs. 
Most interesting, and perhaps practically most relevant, is the case of highly substitutable 
inputs, so that the efficiency loss of mismatched inputs is small—it does not matter much 
when goods are ordered.  Then a high-spending government may find it optimal to 
precommit to spending so much that a subsequent government with low preferences for 
government spending is driven to (or almost to) a corner solution.  In practical terms, a high 
spending government puts in place a big bureaucracy and/or long-term procurement 
contracts that force future governments to maintain a “big government”, like it or not.  This 
effect is asymmetric.  Low precommitted orders do not bind a later high-spending 
government, because the high-spending government can always buy on the spot market.  
Hence, precommitment generates a bias towards high-spending. 
All public goods inputs are financed by lump-sum taxes.  Hence, Ricardian equivalence 
applies so that government debt is neutral and can be ignored.  This is important, because  
precommitted government spending can be interpreted as a government liability.  With lump-
sum taxes, the payment date and the liability characteristic of  precommitted spending is 
irrelevant (Bohn, 1992), showing that our “real”  precommitment mechanism works in a very 
different way than government debt. 
Our first set of results is based on the assumption of an endowment economy.  When we 
incorporate capital investment into the model, the analysis is complicated significantly 
because of interdependence between savings and government spending.  We use a two-
  3period model with capital to show that savings are likely to strengthen the liberal 
government’s incentives to precommit spending. Precommitted spending increases capital 
investment and that investment in turn increases future actual spending by reducing the 
marginal utility of consumption. 
We also examine the situation where the precommitment is of transfer payments rather than a 
government good.  In this case, we find that the results from the main model apply 
analogously.  There is an asymmetry and, when precommitment is available, the government 
with the higher preference for transfer payments can compel the following party to spend 
more than it otherwise would. 
Finally, we consider an Alesina and Tabellini (1990) type model with two categories of 
public goods and governments that disagree about spending priorities, as in Alesina and 
Tabellini (1990).  This model also produces a bias towards high spending when current and 
precommitted purchases are close substitutes, because each government will buy its preferred 
good on the spot market and must honor forward commitments for the other good incurred 
by previous governments. 
Forward spending commitments come in a variety of forms.  Most obviously, most 
government budgeting systems distinguish between current-year appropriations (the actual 
spending) and authorizations that empower the executive branch to incur spending 
commitments for future years (in the US: “Budget Authority”).  Such authorizations are 
rationalized easily because it is often more cost-efficient to procure goods and services with 
advance notice than to use spot markets.  A well-known example is military procurement 
contracts for major weapons programs, which would be virtually impossible without long-
  4term planning.  Less explicitly, most government programs require a physical and human 
infrastructure (office buildings and permanent staff) that cannot be reduced without incurring 
significant cost. 
In the US and many other countries, “mandatory” transfer programs such as social security 
and unemployment insurance are another large category of government outlays that is 
removed from the standard annual appropriations process.  We will show that entitlements 
can also be interpreted as precommitted government spending, distinct from debt, in the 
context of our model.   
This paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 examines the basic model with a single public 
good and two types of government with different preferences for the public good.  Section 3 
explores the implications of capital investment.  Section 4 shows how to interpret transfer 
programs as precommitted spending items.  Section 5 examines a model with two categories 
of public goods and governments that disagree about spending priorities. Section 6 
concludes.  
2.  Partisan disagreement about the size of government 
This section considers a model with a single public good and a private good.  Two types of 
government differ in their relative preferences over public versus private goods. 
2.1  The basic model 
We set up the basic model with a one-period precommitment and no government debt.  
Government of type i (i = R, L) maximizes 






t i g v c u E U    

 
where ct is the private good and gt  is a publicly provided good (public, for short) good.  The 
public good is produced with two inputs, one of which must be chosen one period in 
advance.  For concreteness, we will label the predetermined input Bt, for bureaucracy, and 
the variable input Ot , for operating cost. We assume  
 )  (2)  , ( t t t B O G g 
is increasing in both arguments, concave, and has constant returns to scale. (Additional 
regularity conditions are imposed below.)  The input   is chosen in period t, and 
0  t B  in period t-1.
3  The model may be interpreted literally as a model of gover
administration.  Then B represents the expenses for personnel, office space, and other items 
that are fixed in the short run, while O captures variable cost, such as phones, photocopying, 
and perhaps temporary staff.  The model may also be interpreted more broadly as applying 
whenever precommitted inputs are involved in the provision of government goods or 
services.  For example, the government may have a choice between alternative procurement 
contracts, or between permanent staff and temporary workers. It may place “rush” orders for 
quick delivery (type O expenses) or place contracts that allow sufficient lead time for low 
cost production (type B expenses). The model also applies to transfer programs with O as 
transfer and B representing administrative setup cost (see section 4 for details). 
0  t O
nment 
                                                
A key assumption is that the two possible types of government differ about the valuation of 
the resulting public good.  Specifically, the type L government is assumed to have a 
 
3 In practice, commitments may cover multiple periods and there could be several overlapping commitments, 
which would add persistence to government spending. 
  6relatively strong preference for public goods,  .  Also, elections occur every 
period, so a period should be interpreted as the time between successive elections. 
0  
R L  
We assume that all spending is financed by contemporaneous lump-sum taxes levied on a 
constant endowment stream, Y.
4  The resource constraint is: 
   (3)  t t t O B Y c   
Each period, t, the government in power chooses Bt +1 and Ot, taking as given the level of 
precommitted purchases, Bt.  The optimal decision about Bt +1 clearly depends on how future 
government choices vary with Bt +1. We assume perfect foresight (rational expectations) 
about the policy function Ot +1
i (Bt +1) of the next government.  Election outcomes follow a 
Markov process, where   is the probability of re-election of type i, and expectations are 
taken with respect to election results as there is no other uncertainty.  Denote V
i
ij(Bt) as the 
value function of a government of type i if a government of type j is in power.  Then, optimal 
government decisions must satisfy the following Bellman equation: 
V
ii(Bt) = maxOt ,Bt +1 u(Y – Ot – Bt)+




ij(Bt +1) , 
for i = L, R and j  i, where: 
V
ij(Bt +1)= u(Y – Ot +1
j – Bt +1)+
ivG (Ot +1






j ) . 
This problem simplifies considerably because there are no intertemporal linkages except for 
the precommitted purchase.  For this reason, the solution for Ot only depends on the current 
period utility: 
                                                 
4 Financing decisions are irrelevant in this context. If the government partially debt-financed its purchases, 
consumption opportunities would remain unchanged, assuming lump-sum taxes and no capital investment.  A 
significant assumption is that Bt has a real resource cost in period t and does not represent a use of period t - 1 
endowments.  This timing issue is examined in the next section. 
  7    )) , ( ( ) ( max arg ) ( t t
i
t t O t
i
t B O G v O B Y u B O O
t       . 
It is characterized by the first order condition 
  ,  0 ) ( ) , ( )) , ( ( '      t t t t t O t t
i O B Y u B O G B O G v  
where t is the shadow value of the non-negativity condition Ot  0; that is, t  0, tOt =0.  
The second-order condition 
ivGOO + 
ivGO
2 + u <0 is satisfied, provided v ,   >0 GO  0, 
GOO  0, v , u , with at least one of the weak inequalities being strict.
5  This ensures 
a unique solution for optimal O
  0   0
t.  To simplify, define  )) , ( , B O B O ( ) G v ( f   as the measure 
of utility over productive inputs. Then the first order condition can be written more 
compactly as  
   (4)  0 '    t
i
O
i u f  
where the superscript in  highlights that O
i
O f t is chosen by government i; the second order 
condition is  .




The possibility of a corner solution is important in this context, because pushing the next 
government into a corner is a possible way for a government to constrain its successor.  A 
corner solution with Ot
i(Bt)=0 obtains if: 
  . (5a)  0 ) ( ) , 0 ( )) , 0 ( ( ' ) (     t t O t
i
t
i B Y u B G B G v B h 
Because h
i(Bt) is increasing in   and 
i 
L > 
R >0, the B-values for which the type-L 
government is constrained is a subset of the values for which R is constrained.   
 
                                                 
5 For the discussion, we treat all these inequalities as strict, though the examples will include limiting cases with 
some equalities. Function arguments are dropped when no ambiguity results.  
  8More generally, the marginal benefit of additional current spending varies with precommitted 
















where  .  ) , ( ) , ( )) , ( ( " ) , ( )) , ( ( ' ) , ( B O G B O G B O G v B O G B O G v B O f B O OB
i
OB  
In some application, both inputs may be essential for producing public services so that B and 
O are strongly complementary ( ) as in the case of personnel and phones, so fBO is 
positive even though v”<0. Then O
0  BO G
t
i(Bt) may increase in Bt. In other cases, B and O may be 
close substitutes, so GBO is close to zero. Then fBO is strictly negative, and interior solutions 
for Ot
i(Bt) necessarily depend negatively on Bt.  However, production with O and B may h
different costs. In military procurement, for example, pre-planned spending may be more 
efficient for some expenses (say, as it’s difficult to produce an aircraft carrier on the spot), 
while spot contracts are more efficient in other cases, say, when flexibility is valued. Becaus
of declining marginal utilities (v <0 an
ave 
e 
d u <0), a negative dependence of O on B should 
be considered the intuitively plausible “normal” case even when the two inputs are 
(moderate) complements. For the general discussion, assume therefore that  , 
for both i = L and i = R, unless otherwise noted. If fBO<0, a corner solution O




if and only if 
i
t B B   exceeds a critical value, 
i B , where 
L R B B  . 
For interior solutions, we can explicitly compute  
                                                                                                                                                       
0 ) , ( )) , ( ( " ) , ( )) , ( ( ' ) , (
2    B O G B O G v B O G B O G v B O f O OO
i
OO
6 Note that  is strictly negative 
under the assumptions above. 
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i , we have  , so  1  
i
B O 0 1
) (   
 i
B dB
B O d O
t
t t .  This means that even if a 
government reduces spot-market spending in response to a high Bt, so  , higher 















does not involve Bt.  Hence, Bt +1 does not depend on Bt.  Hence the overall solution to the 
problem of determining B is a pair of real numbers (B
L,B
R) denoting the optimal choices of 
the L and R governments, respectively.  Using the optimal policy functions O
j(B) to evaluate 
V
ii(Bt +1) and V










j) =0, (7) 
where i = R, L, j  i, provided Ot +1
j (Bt +1) is differentiable at Bt +1.  Here, the envelope 
theorem has been invoked to delete terms involving OB
i ; but the envelope theorem does not 
apply to the other government’s choice, OB
i .  Since government j  i sets Ot +1 differently 
than government i would have wanted, government i may have an incentive to manipulate 
Bt +1 to affect the choices of a successor government of the other type. 
To obtain benchmark values for type R and L’s choices of B, note that strategic issues are 
absent if the probability of re-election is 
i =1.  Invoking (4), the first order condition for B 
 10reduces to  , which also implies  B O G G  B O f f  . So, the optimal solution for   is 
entirely driven by technical efficiency considerations.  Efficiency requires that the marginal 
products of current and precommitted spending are equalized.  Given constant returns to 
scale, this condition further implies that the efficient ratio of inputs 
i =1
  O B/  is a constant 
that does not depend on government type.  For reference below, let B
* R and B
* L be the 
optimal choices of B without re-election uncertainty;
7  note that 
L R B B
* *  . 
If re-election is uncertain,  , additional considerations apply.  Most interesting is the 
optimization problem of a type i
i <1
= L government in period t facing the possibility of type 
j = R government taking power in period t + 1.  Then two cases arise.  First the government 
chooses a B value above B
R (but below  )
8 in which case O
R( B
L Bt +1)=0 and OB
R =0; then 







Lv(G(0,B))GB(0,B)–u(Y – B) =0.   (8a) 
Second, the type-L government may choose a B value below the critical value B
R at which R 
















where (4) has been used to eliminate ufrom (7).  
                                                 
7 Notation for optimal choices is indicated by a *, corner solution values are indicated by a bar over the symbol 
L 8 A value B +1> B  will never be chosen because then O t t +1=0 with probability one, which would be 
blatantly inefficient and suboptimal.  To be more precise, for t +1
L, the first order condition for B is  > 
aLv(G(0, )G u(Y (0, ) – – )=0 =0 , since O  would then apply with probability one.  But, since corner solutions 
for O satisfy a )<0 and since G Lv(G(0, )G u(Y (0, ) – –  (0,)>G(0,)
a
, we have 
Lv(G(0, )G u(Y B(0, ) – – )<0
t +1> 
, showing that the first order condition for B cannot be satisfied with 
L. 
 11In case of a corner solution, it is plausible that Bt +1
L  exceeds the otherwise optimal B
*L.  That 
is, the government may pick an inefficiently high level of pre-determined government 
spending for strategic reasons.  A sufficient condition for Bt +1> B




9  Since   and  u <0 fOB
L = vGOB + vGOGB is negative unless GOB >>0, the sufficient 
condition is satisfied unless O and B are strongly complementary in production. 
In case of an interior solution, the conclusions are more conditional.   The ability to raise 
total spending in period t + 1 by raising Bt +1 provides a clear strategic incentive to raise B
L 
above B






10  On 
the other hand, the fact that type R will pick a low O value implies that the fB
R – fO
R term in 
(8b) is likely negative.  Intuitively, choosing a high B value induces R to produce the public 
good in an inefficient way.  Knowing this, type L has an incentive to set a lower value.  
Following Persson and Svensson’s language, the issue is one of relative stubbornness versus 
accommodation. If L is a “stubborn liberal” that has preferences  , and O and B are 
close substitutes so that the cost of inefficient input choices is relatively small (




small) and an increase in B does not trigger a sharp reduction in O
R (OB
R is small, so that R is 
accommodating, 1+OB
R >>0), then the strategic argument will likely dominate so that 
Bt +1> B
*L.  But if R is a “stubborn conservative” that sets OB
R close to -1 and O and B are not 
close substitutes, the strategic factor is likely to be small relative to the efficiency 
                                                 
9 This is because at  = 












 ensures that 
Lf
L – uL
  is decreasing in O, which implies that aLv(G(0, )G u (0, ) – (Y – )>0, so the left hand side of (8b) 
is strictly positive at  = 
* L.  Combined with the second order condition for B, this implies that a solution of 
(8b) must satisfy 
L.   > 
*
10 The second order condition implies that the derivative of (8a) with respect to B is negative.  Also, (8a) is 
negative at  = 
L since fB
i < fO
i at  =0.  Hence, if (8a) is positive at some B value (here 
L), continuity 
implies that there is a solution above. 
 12considerations, resulting in “accommodating” behavior of L, which means Bt +1< B
*L.    The 
examples in the following sections show that both cases can occur. 
To generalize and clarify, there are two principal issues. First, reelection uncertainty creates 
strategic possibilities. Since (8b) applies analogously to R, one finds 





Ot t B t dB
dO
f f f E


           
where E is the expectation with respect over election outcomes. Whenever 
i<1 and 
1   dB
dO
j ,   is non-zero and has the same sign as  . Thus there is a bias 
away from production efficiency (
] [ 1 , 1 ,    t O t B t f f E
j i   
B O f f   for 
i =1) towards more (or less) precommitted 
inputs by the government with higher (or lower) preference for public spending.  
Second, there is question (examined below) under what conditions precommitted spending is 
strategic, accommodating, or unaffected by election uncertainty. Recall that 
L R B B
* *   are 
the preferred values without election uncertainty. Choices  with election 
uncertainty are interpreted as accommodating because they are closer to the other party’s 
preferred value. Choices 
) , (
* * L R i B B B 
R R B B
*   and 
L L B B
*   are strategic, because the only motive for 
moving away from the other party’s preferred choice is to influence the successor. 
Intuitively, the cost of inefficient production (in case of election loss) creates incentives for 
accommodation, whereas the desire to control the level of spending creates incentives for 
extreme behavior. In special cases, these incentives may offset, so
i i B B
*   which means 
election uncertainty would have no effect on B. 
 132.2.  A Graphical Illustration 
Assume that  can take only two values, zero and one.  Figure 1 displays each party’s 
strategy.  Bureaucracy is on the horizontal axis, while operating expenses are on the vertical 
axis.  Given a production function and relative prices, the ray from the origin represents the 
efficient expansion path.  Each party has a bliss point on this ray.  The bliss point is the 
amount of bureaucracy, B
*i, and operating expenses, O
*i, that the party would chose if it was 
certain of reelection.  Since party L has greater preferences for government, its bliss point is 
up and to the right of party R’s.  Indifference curves are concentric and elliptical around the 
bliss points, with decreasing utility as they move farther away from the bliss points. 
Each party has a reaction function, the amount operating expenses it would provide as a 
function of bureaucracy in place when it took office, O
i(B).  This function must go through 
the party’s bliss point.  The reaction functions are shown increasing with constant slope in 
figure 1, but this is not necessary.  We have previously shown that they have a slope greater 
than negative one, and there is no reason for them to even be monotonic. 
For ease of discussion, consider Party R’s decision process.  The analysis for Party L is 
analogous.  If R is in power at time t with certain reelection prospects, it provides B
*R of 
bureaucracy for the following period.  It will achieve its bliss point at period t+1.  If Party R 
has no reelection prospects, then it optimizes by a familiar tangency condition, the tangency 
between L’s reaction function and R’s indifference curve, B
R in figure 1. 
We have shown accommodating behavior by R, extreme behavior by L, and unique solutions 
in figure 1.  In fact, either party may be accommodating or extreme, depending on the 
production and utility functions.  Furthermore, even with “well behaved” functional forms, 
 14multiple solutions may exist.  In this case, changes in the slope, or even the sign of the slope, 
of the reaction function results in multiple tangencies. 
2.3. Simple Examples 
This section provides illustrative examples. Examples 1-3 are scenarios with linear or 
piecewise linear production. Examples 4-5 are special cases where B does not depend on 
election uncertainty. 
Example 1: Linear Production 
A simple example in which L pushes R into a corner is the case of perfect substitutes, 
G(O, B)=O + B.  When the government with the higher preferences, type L, is in power, it 
can always set the amount of government in the following period to its optimal value, g
*L, by 
setting Bt +1= g
*L, without regard to the particulars of the utility function.  Type L, if it 
follows a type R will just increase current spending to g
*L.  Therefore Type R cannot 
constrain type L.  A type R can only reduce g below g
*L by holding office for at least two 
consecutive periods. 
This example illustrates the role of corner solutions.  Since there is no “real” technological 
interaction between O and B (as O and B enter additively in both preferences and the budget 
constraint), B does not affect the next government’s choices unless the later government is at 
a corner solution. 
 15Example 2:  Leontief Production 
Consider the case of perfect complements,    B O G a a   1
1 1 , min  where  0 < a < 1. In this 
example R can ensure the preferred level of spending   without regard to L’s 
preferences. Namely, if R sets  , a subsequent L government cannot set 
a higher level of g and must set  . Conversely, suppose the Type L 
government is in power with electoral uncertainty and were to set . Because 






t g a B B
* *
1 ) 1 (    
R R L ag B O
* * ) ( 
R
t g a B
*
1 ) 1 (   
Y – Bt +1 available to a subsequent Type R government, a 
stubborn type R government may pick Ot +1< O
* R and g < g
* R, which would reduced L’s 
expected utility.  Hence, party L cannot gain by picking a B-value above B
* L and will choose 
B
L  B
* L.  Overall, one finds that R never accommodates L while L accommodates R. This 
result relies heavily on the Leontief technology, as the following slight modification 
demonstrates. 
Example 3:  Capacity choice 
Consider the same Leontief production function as in Example 2, but suppose there is an 
alternative, higher-cost technology that can produce g and only uses O as input.  Specifically, 
suppose overall production is  
   ,  where  0<a<1 and b>1. 
otherwise
)) 1 /( /   if   ,
)] 1 /( / [
)} 1 /( , / min{ a B a O
a B a O ba B









One may interpret B as a capacity choice (the size of the bureaucracy).  Current spending, O, 
complements the predetermined B until the capacity is fully used. Up to  , the 
variable cost of producing g is only a<1, as compared to a total unit cost of 1.  For 
)) 1 /( a aB O  




, capacity must be put in place in short notice, which is assume to have a 
higher cost b . If L follows R, the L government can always produce as much G as it 
desires at unit cost b.  As b approaches 1, L provides spending close to  regardless of B
R. 
Hence, the R government cannot stop a stubborn L government from spending.  
L g
*
In practice almost any good or service can be produced without much advance notice (if one 
is willing to pay the price), suggesting that this example is more plausible than Example 2.  
In each of these first three examples, the marginal product of O is constant for all interior 
choices of B. This is limiting because it means that neither party can gain by setting B outside 
the interval  . Strategic behavior is implicitly ruled out. Thus the main purpose of 
Examples 1-3 is to build intuition that will prove useful in more complicated settings below.  
]
*L B ,
Example 4:  Affine preferences with separability over inputs 
Suppose the technology is Cobb-Douglas,  , where 0<a<1, and 
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which precludes interdependence between O and B except through the budget constraint. 
Moreover, assume   is linear. Then the budgetary interdependence vanishes: For 
each type i, the optimal choices are   and  . Hence the optimal 
solution for O does not depend on B; formally, 
t t c c u  ) (
a O
i i
t   ) 1 ( 1 a B
i i
t    




i =0, neither government has an incentive to manipulate its choice of B, and B does not 
depend on reelection.  
 17Example 5:  Logarithmic preferences with separability over inputs 
Consider the same setting as in Example 4, but with logarithmic utility over private 
consumption,  . Because optimal spending shares are constant with log-utility, 
the first order conditions for O  can be solved explicitly to obtain 
) ln( ) ( t t c c u 
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1 . As in Example 4, the optimal choice of B does not depend on re-election 
probabilities.   
The irrelevance of re-election probabilities in this Example has more of a knife-edge 
character than in Example 4:  Though a high precommitted B does reduce O, the strategic 
incentive for L to raise B is offset by a concern that this would reduce private consumption. 
Examples 4-5 illustrate that preferences and technology can interact in ways that efficiency 
concerns and strategic incentives cancel out in setting B. This suggests an examination of a 
broader class of preferences and technologies. 
2.4  Power utility and CES Production 
This section provides a more systematic analysis of how preferences and production 
technology influence the strategic interaction between L and R governments.  We assume 
power utility over c and g, and CES production. The curvature of power utility (η ) provides 
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 18where 0   . The case  1    is interpreted as log-utility. For production, assume  
    
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with elasticity of factor substitution e>0, weight 0 < a < 1, and scale parameter A>0. The 
special case e=1 represents Cobb-Douglas. CES technology precludes corner solutions for O 
because GO  as O . However, the optimal choice of B is not necessarily a concave 
problem, which makes analytical solutions difficult to obtain.
11 Hence we present numerical 
results.  
 0
Numerical results for a range of parameter pairs  ) , ( e   are shown in Tables 1-3. For all 
calculations, we assume a=0.5 so O and B have the same weight in production; we normalize 







); and we set Y=1. Weights 
 vary across simulations so that L and R have stable preferences over the size of 
government. Specifically,   is set so   and   whereas   is set so 
 and  . Efficient production requires O=B and yields g=O=B, so 
 and  . For elections, assume  . 
) , (
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For production, Table 1 starts with ε=2, which means that g can be produced with any one 
input at twice the cost (i.e.,  2
1 ) 0 , 1 ( ) 1 , 0 (   G G ). Panel (a) shows allocations implied by 
certain reelection (for reference), and Panel (b) shows results for uncertain reelection and 
log-utility (η=1.0). Panels (c-d) shows allocations for preferences with lower or higher 
curvature, η=0.5 and η=2.0. In all cases (with reelection uncertainty), R sets 
                                                 
B
11 Notably, though corner solutions do not exist, L may have incentives to set B so high that R  will set O very 
close to zero; then O
R is also near zero, implying that L essentially controls the next period’s spending. This 
 191 . 0
*  
R R B B closer to L’s preferred value, and L sets   further away from 
R’s preferred value. Thus R is accommodating whereas L displays strategic behavior. By 
setting B
L high, L ensures higher government spending if R is elected. Comparing across 
cases, Table 1 shows that more stubbornness (higher η) implies higher B
L and higher B
R, i.e., 
more accommodation by R and more aggressively strategic behavior by L; outcomes are 
closer to L’s than R’s preferences.  
2 . 0
*  
L L B B
Table 1 also shows outcomes for operating spending, consumption, and public goods 





L) tends to be small and O
L(B
R) tends to be high, reflecting attempts to offset the 
impact of inherited “wrong” levels of precommitted inputs. Values of O and g conditional on 
B
L are higher than the corresponding values given B
R: precommitment matters. 
Taking averages across cells, one finds that average values of B+O are 30.6% for η=0.5, 
31.3% for η=1, and 32.1% for η=2.0. They all exceed 30%, which is the average of desired 
spending by L and R. The average provision of public goods (g) is somewhat less than 
spending because election uncertainty implies inefficient production (GB≠GO); nonetheless, 
average values of g exceed 30% except for the lowest η-value. Thus the L government 
succeeds in raising average government spending. The more stubborn the parties the higher 
is government spending. 
Table 2 provides three examples to show that qualitatively different outcomes are possible 
for more extreme parameter values. Panel 2(a) shows results for η=1.0, and ε =0.5. In this 
                                                                                                                                                       
B
explains why the first order conditions for B
L  tend to have two solutions for high e-values: one solution pushes 
R to set O near zero; the other sets B much lower, in a range were O
R is close to minus one. 
 20case,   and  , L is accommodating whereas R acts strategically. 
The economic intuition builds on Example 2. For CES production with ε ≤1, both inputs are 
essential, which means that R can limit g by setting B low, and L must worry a successor 
type-R government will set O low. This encourages strategic behavior by R and 
accommodation by L.  
1 . 0
*  
R R B B 2 . 0
*  
L L B B
Panel 2(b) shows results for η=10 and ε =0.5. In this case, both parties are accommodating 
even though the stubbornness index is extremely high. The intuition here is that both parties 
are so stubborn that if either party were to set 
i i B B
*  , the other party would set operating 
expenses in a way that production would be extremely inefficient. Interestingly, this suggests 
that mutual stubbornness can force both parties to compromise. Even with accommodating 
behavior, production is sufficiently inefficient that spending on B+O exceeds 30% whereas g 
is less than 30%. 
Panel (c) shows results for η=1.0 and ε =10. In this case, L has an incentive to set B
L so high 
that a value of g close to g
*L is obtained even when R is elected and sets O
R near zero. This is 
an extreme form of strategic behavior. The intuition follows Example 1, because CES 
production with ε =10 is nearly linear. 
Table 3 provides a qualitative characterization of outcomes over a wide range of parameters. 
For each parameter pair  ) , ( e  , table entries indicate if L and R (first and second entry, 
respectively) are accommodating (labeled A), strategic (labeled S), or setting B
i=B
*i (N for 
neutral), respectively. The table shows that L sets precommitted spending strategically 
(B
L>B
*L) when the elasticity of substitution e is high, whereas R acts strategically (B
R<B
*R) 
when the elasticity of substitution e is low—as is consistent with the intuition from Examples 
 211 and 2. Both parties are accommodating if η is very high—as in the Example of Table 3(b). 
Table 3 also shows that there is a thin slice of the parameter space where both governments 
act strategically (e.g., η=0.5 and e=1.6).  
Overall, Table 3 indicates that for e>1 (where no single input is essential), L act strategically 
for a wide range of η values. For e<1, L also act strategically if η is low but not near zero.  
3. A Two Period Model with Capital 
The extension to add savings decisions complicates the analysis significantly, because 
savings and government spending are interdependent.  Individually optimal savings depend 
on future taxes, i. e. on expected future government spending.  Intuitively, this 
interdependence is likely to strengthen a partisan government’s incentives to act 
strategically.  By setting B high, a type-L government can signal to individuals that next 
period’s government spending will be high, inducing them to save more.  The increased 
savings reduce next period’s marginal utility of consumption and thereby encourage higher 
on-the-spot spending, O.  Conversely, by setting B low, R governments can induce 
individuals to save less, which raises next period’s marginal utility of consumption and 
deters a subsequent L government from spending too much.  Optimal (for the current 
government) spending depends on the marginal utility of consumption, which depends on 
past savings decisions.  Since a two-period setting is sufficient to illustrate the conceptual 
points, we examine the government problem with savings in a simple two-period version of 
our model.  We also provide an example that highlights the differences between this 
extension and the basic model. 
 22As before, we assume lump-sum taxes.  Thus, Ricardian equivalence applies and debt per se 
does not matter.  Any effects of precommitted government spending must therefore be “real” 
effects that do not depend on financing decisions. 
Assuming period-1 savings, k, yield return F(k), where   and  0 ' F 0 " F . Individual 
consumption in the two periods is: 
  ,  1 1 1 O B k Y c    
  2 2 2 ) ( O B k F Y c     . 
We assume that each agent is small enough that she does not take into consideration the 
effect of her choice of k on the government’s choice of  O and B.  She maximizes: 
V(k)=u(1 – k – O1 – B1)+u(1 + F(k)–O2
i – B2)+( 1–) u(1 + F(k)–O2
j – B2) . 
The following first order condition must hold: u(c1 )=F(k)E[u(c2 )]. 
Therefore, k = k(B2, O2
L, O2
R, O1 + B1, )
2(O2)=u(Y + F(k)–O2 – B
.  At t2, the government in power maximizes, with 
respect to O:V 2)+vG (O2, B2) .  The first order condition 
u(c2 )=
iv(g2)gO(O2, B2 ) must hold.  Therefore, O2
i = O(B2, k, 
i).  The new item here is 
the dependence of O on the capital stock.  A higher k reduces the marginal utility of private 
consumption and therefore encourages more government spending. 
The party in power maximizes, over O  and B2:  1
V
ii = u(Y – k – O1 – B1)+
ivG (O1, B1) + E u(Y + F(k)–O2 – B2)+
ivG (O2, B2i) , 
where: k = k(B2, O2
L, O2
R, )and O2
i = O(B2, k, 
i).     
The first order conditions are:   




























The first two terms reflect the same efficiency and strategic issues as in Section 2.  The last 
term is new and reflects the indirect effect of B2 on O  through capital investment.  To the 
extent that 
2
B2 raises expected period - 2 lump-sum taxes, individuals will save:  dk
dB2
>0.  
Capital investment in turn increases spending on O  by reducing the marginal utility of 
period - 2 consumption, dO
2
2
dk >0.  Therefore, savings are likely to strengthen the L 
government’s ability to raise total period-2 spending by setting precommitted spending, B2, 
to a high value. 
This section also resolves the question of whether or not it matters if Bt has a real resource 
cost in period t or t - 1:  If resources can be shifted over time through a reasonable elastic 
capital investment technology, the difference does not matter (In the limiting case of a linear 
F(k)=k technology, not at all). 
Example 6: The Role of Saving 
Consider log utility over all goods u ,  (c) = ln (c) v(g) = ln (g), g = O
aB
1 – a, and F(k)=k.  
Recall that these are the same functional forms as Example 5, which was a special case 
where B was independent of .  Here, we show that with savings this independence 
disappears. 
 24As in Example 5, we can solve the first order conditions explicitly for O and B: 
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Assume the parameters Y = 1, 
L = 4, 
R = 1, B1 = 0.125,  = 1, and a = 0.5.  When re-
election is certain, R will precommit B2 = 0.267857 and L will precommit B2 = 0.46875.  
With re-election uncertainty,  = 0.5, both types act more strategically, B2 = 0.256849 for R 
and B2 = 0.491803 for L. Thus,  . 




2 2   
This example demonstrates that savings increases the strategic opportunities of the 
governments.  In an example where there are no strategic opportunities in the absence of 
saving, and the presence of saving gives both parties incentives to set precommitted spending 
strategically. 
4.  Transfer Payments 
Transfer programs account for a large fraction of government budgets in most advanced 
countries.  This section will explain why the strategic issues discussed above apply 
analogously to the transfer programs, and not just to real expenditures.  Most transfer 
programs require an extensive administrative infrastructure to identify potential recipients 
and to monitor their eligibility (say, for welfare).  The benefits of a transfer program, TR, 
depend on the transferred funds and on how efficiently the program is administered, which is 
a function of the available infrastructure.  As before, let O be the current cost - for transfers 
 25plus current administrative spending - and B be the precommitted infrastructure, and assume 
TR = TR(Ot, Bt) where TR , TR , TR , and TR .  O >0 B >0 OO <0 BB <0
To motivate transfers, it is natural to consider a heterogeneous agent setting.  Hence, we 
assume that there are two types of agents with incomes Y1 and Y2 respectively.  The partisan 
disagreement is now about the merit of transfers from one group to the other.  To be specific, 
assume Y1 > Y2 and let the disagreement be about the size of transfers from the rich (type-1) 
to the poor (type-2).  The agents’ consumption depend on income and transfers: 
c1t = Y1 – Ot – Bt, and  c2t = Y2 + TRt.  The parties differ over how much negative utility they 
derive from income inequality.  The government of type i( i = L, R )maximizes: 
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L R  
Assume   are small enough that  ) , ( t t B O 2 1 ) , ( Y Y B O B O TR t t t t     , so  . Then the 
model is equivalent to the main model if one reinterprets 
t t c c 2 1 
t t c c 1   as type-1 consumption, 
 as type-2 consumption,   and  ) , ( 2 t t t t B O c g  2 TR Y  







1 . That is, one 
can reinterpret L and R as governments that care relatively more or less about the type-2 “low 
income” agents. In this sense, the analysis of Section 2 applies analogously to transfer 
programs. 
5.  Partisan disagreements about spending priorities 
This section considers an Alesina-Tabellini (1989) type model with two government goods, 
disagreement about composition, but no disagreement about ideal level of total spending.  
We show that this model is also prone to a spending bias in addition to the deficit bias 
discussed by Alesina and Tabellini.  To simplify, we again consider a model without capital. 
 26The model is as follows.  There are two public goods, g1 and g2.  Good g1 is produced with 
inputs O  and  1 B1, while good g2 is produced with inputs O  and  2 B2:   and 
.  The inputs 
) , ( 1 1 1 t t t B O g G 
) 2t B , 2 2 t t g  (O H B1t  and B2t are precommitted in the prior period.  Inputs O1t 
and O2t  are committed in period t.  A government of type i (i = R, L) maximizes: 
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The type L government is assumed to have a relatively strong preference for good g1 while 
the type R government prefers good g2:1 .  In contrast to the previous section, 
we assume symmetric preferences over total private versus public spending, with utility 
weights on 
0   
L R  
g1 and g2 that sum to one for both governments. 
We still assume that all spending is financed by contemporaneous lump-sum taxes levied on 
a constant endowment stream, Y =1.  The technical analysis is similar to the basic model of 
Section 2 except that the dimensionality doubles with two goods.
12 As in section 2, interior 
and corner solutions are possible.  An example of a corner solution is the case of perfect 
substitution between O  and  1 B1, and between O  and  2 B2.  As in Example 1, when the inputs 
are perfect substitutes the party with higher preferences for a good can always put the other 
party in a corner solution for that good, simply by precommitting the preferred amount.  To 
demonstrate that both parties have strategic incentives, consider the following example. 
Example 7:  Two public goods with CES Production 
Assume log utility over all goods and CES production for both government goods. Table 4 




4 , and production a = 1
2 ,  =–1
2 , A=1 (for both 
 27goods). With certain reelection (=1), both parties set gi=Bi=Oi=3/16 for their (respective) 
preferred public good, and gi=Bi=Oi=1/16 for the other good. For =0.5, both set Bi=0.354 
for the preferred good and Bi=0.017 for the other. Both parties become more strategic when 
there is re-election uncertainty, in the sense of setting high precommitment values for the 
preferred good and lower precommitment values for the other good. Moreover, the presence 
of electoral uncertainty raises total government spending and taxes at the expense of private 
consumption:. in the example, one finds c=0.43 for =0.5 as compared to c=0.5 for =0.5.  
6.  Conclusions 
The paper examines a simple model of forward commitment of government spending.  We 
argue that forward commitment arises out of efficiency considerations, but its existence 
provides strategic opportunities for political parties that differ in preferences.  The basic 
setting is an endowment model with one private and one government-produced good, where 
two parties differ in preferences for the size of government. For a wide set of preference and 
specifications, the party with stronger preferences for public spending will commit more than 
its optimal amount to force the other party to provide more government when they are in 
power.  The party with lower preferences for the government good tends to be driven by 
efficiency reasons to accommodate the other party and to provide more forward commitment 
than it would otherwise choose.  Thus spending commitments and electoral uncertainty tends 
to increase public spending. These results are illustrated in simple examples and documented 
numerically in a setting with power utility and CES production. 
                                                                                                                                                       
12 Because of the analytical similarities and cumbersome notation, details are omitted. 
 28When savings choices are added to the model, strategic behavior is reinforced for both 
parties.  With re-election uncertainty, the party with lower preferences for spending may 
precommit even less than without savings in order to constrain the following government’s 
spending.  The party with high preferences for the government good may precommit more 
than it would in the absence of re-election uncertainty or savings to force the following 
government to spend  more than it otherwise would. 
In a model with two government goods where parties differ in preferences for the goods, 
forward commitment is biased upwards.  Both parties commit greater amounts of their 
preferred good in order to encourage the other party to supply more of that good.  Taxes are 
higher and consumption is lower relative to allocations with certain re-election. 
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Note: The government produces g=G(O,B) with two inputs, a fixed bureaucracy” (B), which 
is installed in the previous period, and operating cost (O), which are variable. Party L prefers 
more government spending than party R. 
 
 31Table 1: Main Examples with Power Utility and CES production 
 
 (a)   
Benchmark:  = 1 
 (b)  
η=1.0 and e=2.0 
Variables  L R L R 
B
i  20.0% 10.0% 21.3% 10.7% 
O
i(B
L)  20.0%  19.3%  6.4% 
O
 i(B
R)   10.0%  25.8%  9.7% 
g
 i(B
L)  40.0%  40.6%  25.5% 
g
 i(B
R)   20.0%  34.8%  20.4% 
c
 i(B
L)  60.0%  59.4%  72.3% 
c
 i(B
R)   80.0%  63.5%  79.6% 
   Average B+O  30.0% 31.3% 
   Average g  30.0% 30.3% 
 
 
 (c)   
η=0.5 and e=2.0 
(d)  
η=2.0 and e=2.0 
Variables L  R  L  R 
B
i  20.3% 10.2% 23.8% 11.6% 
O
i(B
L)  19.9% 8.9% 17.3% 4.0% 
O
 i(B
R)  22.5% 10.0% 27.2%  9.0% 
g
 i(B
L)  40.2% 28.0% 40.9% 23.7% 
g
 i(B
R)  31.5% 20.2% 37.1% 20.5% 
c
 i(B
L)  59.8% 70.8% 58.9% 72.2% 
c
 i(B
R)  67.4% 79.8% 61.2% 79.4% 
   Average B+O  30.6% 32.1% 
   Average g  30.0% 30.5% 
 
Note: See Section 2.4 for interpretation. Panels (b)-(d) assume  = 0.5. 
 32Table 2: Examples with more extreme parameters 
 
 
 (a)   
η=1.0 and e=0.5 
(b)  
η=4.0 and e=0.5 
(c)  
η=1.0 and e=10.0 
Variables  L  R L R L R 
B
i  19.3% 9.5%  18.4% 12.0% 36.1% 11.2% 
O
i(B
L)  19.9%  11.1%  20.9%  7.8% 7.1% 0.1% 
O
 i(B
R)  17.3%  9.9% 26.0% 9.3% 28.2% 9.0% 
g
 i(B
L)  39.2%  28.1% 39.1% 21.9% 42.2% 33.6% 
g
 i(B
R)  24.5%  19.4% 32.8% 20.9% 39.0% 20.2% 
c
 i(B
L)  60.8%  69.6% 60.7% 73.8% 56.8% 63.8% 
c
 i(B
R)  73.2%  80.6% 62.0% 78.7% 60.6% 79.8% 
 Average B+O  28.9% 31.2%  34.7% 
 Average g  27.8% 28.7%  33.7% 
 
Note: See Section 2.4 for interpretation. All cases assume  = 0.5. Allocations for  = 1 
would be the same as in Table 1(a). 
 
 33Table 3: Power Utility and CES production: Accommodation versus Strategic Behavior  
 
 
Entries for (L, R) are labeled as A = Accommodating, S = Strategic, or N = Neutral.  
 Utility  curvature  η 
Elasticity  e  0.50 0.75 1.00 1.50 2.00 4.00 
0.25  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, S) 
0.50  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, A) 
0.60  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, A)  ( A, A) 
0.70  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, A)  ( A, A) 
0.80  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, A)  ( S, A)  ( A, A) 
0.90  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A) 
1.00  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( N, N)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A) 
1.10  ( A, S)  ( A, S)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A) 
1.20  ( A, S)  ( S, S)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A) 
1.30  ( A, S)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A) 
1.40  ( A, S)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A) 
1.50  ( A, S)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A) 
1.60  ( S, S)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A) 
1.70  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A) 
1.80  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A) 
1.90  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A) 
2.00  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A) 
4.00  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A) 
6.00  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A) 
8.00  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A) 
10.00  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A)  ( S, A) 
 
Note: Entries characterize the behavior of type L and R governments for different 
combinations of utility curvature η and CES elasticity e. For example, ( S, A) mean L acts 
strategically and R accommodates. Italics and shading are use to highlight the different 
behaviors. Note that  ( S, A) tends to apply when preferences are sufficiently curved and e is 
not too low. 
 34Table 4: Example with two public goods (Example 7) 
 
  Benchmark:  = 1  Uncertain Reelection:  = 0.5 
Variables  L R L R 
B1  18.75%   6.25% 35.42% 1.72% 
B2   6.25%  18.75%   1.72%  35.42% 
O1(B1
L)  18.75%  12.01%  7.33% 
O1(B1
R)   18.75%    7.33%  12.01% 
O2(B2
L)    6.25%    7.33%  12.01% 
O2(B2
R)     6.25%  12.01%  7.33% 
c(B1
L) 50.0%    43.52%  43.52% 
c(B1
R)   50.0%  43.52%  43.52% 
g1(B1
L)  18.75%  22.09%  5.70% 
g1(B1
R)     6.25%  18.66%  4.04% 
g2(B2
L)    6.25%    4.04%  18.66% 
g2(B2
R)   18.75%  5.70%  22.09% 
  Average Bi  12.5% 18.57% 
  Average Oi  12.5%   9.67% 
  Average Bi+Oi  25.0% 28.24% 
  Average gi  12.5% 12.62% 
 
Note: See Section 5 for interpretation.  
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